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Abstract
Mega-sporting events such as the FIFA World Cup are expensive affairs. Host countries
often justify the spending required to stage these events by predicting that mega-events will draw
large numbers of tourists. This paper analyzes monthly foreign tourist arrivals into Brazil
between 2003 and 2015 and finds that the 2014 FIFA World Cup increased foreign tourism by
roughly one million visitors. This number far exceeded expectations, but we show that roughly a
quarter of this increase in foreign tourism was caused by the fortuitous advancement of
Argentina’s national team, and potential hosts should not count on the event to consistently
produce out-sized tourism figures We conclude that on-field results can greatly influence FIFA
World Cup tourism.
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Introduction
Major international sporting events are considered valuable prizes by many countries, and
the competition to host these events can be vigorous. In order to justify the costs of hosting, it is
often claimed that these events attract large numbers of well-heeled foreign visitors and can be
engines of economic growth after the event. The 2014 FIFA (Fédération Internationale de
Football Association) World Cup is no exception. Leading up to the event, the Brazilian Ministry
of Sports forecasted the event would be worth no less than $70 billion and attract 600,000
tourists to Brazil.1 Such claims were probably necessary to justify the extraordinary expense to
host the event. The Brazilian Ministry of Sports reported stadium construction cost $3.6 billion.2
FIFA concedes that the overall cost of the event was $15 billion, though the organization
contributed $2 billion towards operational costs.3
Unfortunately hosting decisions must be made on ex ante predictions of economic
impact, which have a significant amount of variation and can be manipulated by those in favor of
hosting. For example, the consulting firm Grant Thornton South Africa initially predicted
483,000 international visitors for the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa. The firm revised
their figures downward multiple times, once to “a gross economic impact of $12 billion to the
country’s economy” with 373,000 international visitors (Voigt, 2011), and then subsequently
placing the economic impact at $7.5 billion along with 198,400 annual jobs (Rihlamvu, 2011).
Following the event, a report suggested “309,554 foreign tourists arrived in South Africa for the
1 Rapoza, Kenneth, “FIFA World Cup Forecast To Add $70 Billion To Brazil's Economy”, Forbes, July 8 2011.
2 Manfred, Tony, “What Brazil's Brand-New $3.6-Billion World Cup Stadiums Look Like”, Business Insider, June
9 2014.
3 FIFA, “FAQ: Setting the Record Straight”,
http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/tournament/competition/02/36/32/63/faq_en_neutral.pdf , accessed March 16
2017.
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primary purpose of attending the 2010 FIFA World Cup” and spent 3.64 billion rand (roughly
$500 million using contemporaneous exchange rates) during their stay (FIFA, 2010). While ex
ante predictions can be useful, ex post economic impact estimates for similar events should also
be considered. This is perhaps more vital in recent years as FIFA World Cups and Olympiads
have been held in developing countries hoping to use the event to spur economic growth, e.g.
Brazil (2014 FIFA World Cup, 2016 Summer Olympics), South Africa (2010 FIFA World Cup),
and Russia (2012 Winter Olympics, 2018 FIFA World Cup).
This paper has two contributions. First, we estimate the net impact of the 2014 FIFA
World Cup on foreign tourism into Brazil. Using monthly tourist arrival data from 2003 to 2015,
we estimate the 2014 FIFA World Cup increased foreign visitors to Brazil by about one million
people, which is significantly higher than government expectations of 600,000 prior to the event.
Second, we identify a substantial source of variation to any ex ante economic impact prediction
of the FIFA World Cup: on-field results. The FIFA World Cup finals begin with 32 teams, each
of which is guaranteed three games during the “group stage” of the tournament. The outcomes of
the group stage leave 16 teams in the “knockout round”, which comprises of single elimination
games. In terms of foreign tourism, the best scenario for the host country is that a nearby
competitor will advance deep into the knockout round, which will attract its fans to the host
country. Fortunately for Brazil, this is precisely what happened in 2014. Argentina, a populous
country that shares a border with Brazil, saw its national team advance to the final game of the
2014 FIFA World Cup. We estimate this exogenous, on-field result had an enormous impact on
foreign tourism into Brazil, particularly in July 2014 when Argentinians comprised over 80
percent of the net increase in foreign tourism. Supposing instead that Argentine national team
was eliminated during its quarterfinal game to Belgium on July 5, 2014, we estimate that roughly
3

250,000 fewer foreign tourists would have entered Brazil during the FIFA World Cup. In
essence, the advancement of the Argentine national team contributed roughly one-quarter of the
net increase in foreign tourists attributed to the FIFA World Cup. We conclude that on-field
results greatly influence the net increase in tourism and therefore the potential economic impact,
which means any ex ante prediction of an economic payoff from the FIFA World Cup is subject
to a considerable amount of uncertainty completely out of the control of the event organizers.

Impact Analysis
Organizers routinely claim that sporting events have a large impact on host economies
through the direct spending of tourists, and the FIFA World Cup is no exception. According to
the consulting firm Deloitte, the 2007 Rugby World Cup attracted over 350,000 overseas visitors
to France, while the event “can deliver between £260m and £1.1 billion of Gross Value Added to
a Host Nation, depending on location” (Deloitte, 2008). The United Kingdom’s (UK)
Department of Transport expected 500,000 tourists and 70,000 athletes and officials for the 2012
Summer Olympics in London, an increase of 260,000 visitors over a typical summer month (The
Week, 2012). Early predictions for the 2016 Summer Olympics in Rio de Janeiro suggested the
event would bring an additional 480,000 tourists, with “experts believ[ing] this number could be
surpassed” (Utley, 2014).
Impressive tourism predictions are not limited to weeks-long tournaments such as FIFA
World Cups or the Olympiads. Some tourism estimates for the 2005 National Basketball
Association All-Star Game were as high as 100,000, even though the event was held in arena that
has less than 20,000 in capacity (Matheson, 2008). The National Football League’s (NFL) ProBowl has been predicted to attract nearly 50,000 visitors (Baumann and Matheson, 2016) and the
4

NFL Super Bowl typically claims of tourist flows of 100,000 to 125,000 with some predicting
that the 2014 game would attract up to 400,000 visitors to the New York City metropolitan area.
(Prieto, 2014)
Of course, the expenses associated with hosting an event like the FIFA World Cup or the
Olympics are quite large, and the majority of these costs are typically borne by the host country.
Regarding infrastructure, FIFA requires host countries to have between eight and 12 stadiums
capable of seating at least 40,000 spectators, and one of these stadiums must have at 80,000
capacity for the opening and final games. Olympiads require playing facilities for multiple
sports, housing for 15,000 athletes and officials, and a minimum of 40,000 hotel rooms available
for spectators. Despite being one of the most popular tourist destinations in South America, Rio
de Janeiro still required the construction of over 15,000 new hotel rooms for the 2016 Summer
Games (Baade and Matheson, 2016). The 2010 FIFA World Cup produced $3.9 billion in
expenses paid by South Africa, including at least $1.3 billion in stadium construction costs
(Voigt, 2010). As noted previously, Brazil’s 2014 FIFA World Cup carried a price tag estimated
at $15 billion, including at least $3.6 billion in total spending on 12 new or refurbished stadiums.
Economists are typically skeptical that mega-events can generate sufficient economic
benefits to cover the costs of hosting these tournaments (see Baade and Matheson, 2016, or
Coates and Humphreys, 2008, among others). First, tourism estimates made prior to the event,
especially if they are published by organizations with a vested interest, may be exaggerated in
order to increase the amount of public subsidies. Second, if an event draws a primarily local
audience, then spending at the event does not represent new money to the economy but rather a
reallocation within the local area. Third, not all tourism spending stays in the local economy,
particularly for expenditures on goods and services provided by multinational corporations.
5

These leakages reduce the multiplier effect and thereby decrease the amount of economic impact
generated by the event (Matheson, 2009).
A fourth issue is “crowding out”, which occurs when the congestion of a mega-event
dissuades other tourism or business travel to the host region. It is possible that this displacement
effect may be severe, especially if the event is held during a high tourist season when hotel
rooms are typically full. The UK Office for National Statistics (2015) reported that the number of
international visitors to the country during the 2012 Summer Olympics fell to 6.174 million
visitors compared to 6.568 million the year before, and some popular shows in London’s theater
district shut down during the Games. Similarly, Beijing similarly reported a 30 percent drop in
international visitors and a 39 percent drop in hotel occupancy during the month of the 2008
Summer Olympics compared to the previous year. Utah ski resorts noted a 9.9 percent fall in
attendance during the 2002 Salt Lake City Winter Olympics and a drop in taxable sales
collections at these locations compared to the previous year (Zimbalist, 2015; Baade, Baumann,
and Matheson, 2010). Taxable sales and skier visits rebounded the following season clearly
implicating the Olympics in the one-time drop.
While there is a clear relationship, it must be noted that there is not a one to one
connection between the number of tourists to an event and the event’s economic impact. Often
visitors to mega-sporting events are considered to be wealthier than the average tourist. Only the
well-heeled, it is thought, can afford the steep ticket prices and costly accommodations that
accompany a major event. For example, the average ticket price on secondary markets for Super
Bowl tickets routinely exceed $2,500, and even the cheapest ticket available to foreigners for the
2018 World Cup in Russia is $105. (Seatgeek, 2017; Boehm, 2016) If sports tourists are
wealthier, then a major event may cause overall tourism spending to rise even if there is not a net
6

increase in the number of tourists. Heller and Stephenson’s (2017) analysis of hotel receipts
during mega-events finds that the vast majority of the increase in accommodation revenue during
the Super Bowl occurs due to an increase in spending per person rather than an increase in the
number of visitors. On the other hand, certain sports teams may have die-hard fans with bigger
hearts than wallets. Anecdotally, a large number of Latin American visitors to Brazil during the
World Cup spent their time sleeping on beaches rather than in luxury hotels. (Zimbalist, 2015). If
this type of tourist made up a majority of the increase in visitors to the country during the World
Cup, a significant increase in tourism may not result in a proportionally large increase in visitor
spending. This analysis differentiates arrivals by air and ground in an attempt to address this
issue.
Several academic studies have examined tourism inflows and visitor spending at FIFA
World Cups. In general, the research finds, at best, modest impacts from hosting. Hagn and
Maennig (2008) argue that the 1974 FIFA World Cup in Germany “was not able to generate any
medium to long-term employment effects that were significantly different from zero”. Baade and
Matheson (2004) estimate that host cities of the 1994 FIFA World Cup in the United States
experienced a cumulative loss of at least $5.5 billion. Feddersen, Grötzinger, and Maennig
(2009) could not statistically identify any positive employment or income effects after the
construction of stadiums for the 2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany. Allmers and Maennig
(2009) examine overnight hotel stays and national tourism income and find no identifiable
impact in either category in France during the 1998 FIFA World Cup. However, the same study
estimates the 2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany produced an increase of approximately 700,000
additional hotel nights sold to foreigners and an additional 600 to 700 million euros (US$ 830 to
970 million) in net national tourism income.
7

In the research closest in nature to the analysis performed here, Du Plessis and Maennig
(2011) and Peeters, Matheson and Szymanski (2014) both examine monthly tourist arrivals into
South Africa with a focus on the 2010 FIFA World Cup. Both studies find that the country
experienced an increase in tourism during the months of the tournament, but the net increase in
tourist arrivals (40,000-80,000 in Du Plessis and Maennig, 2011, and 220,000 in Peeters, et al.,
2014) were a fraction of the levels claimed by event organizers prior to the competition. Finally,
Sterken (2006) analyzes FIFA World Cups from 1974 to 2004 and finds the event produces no
discernable impact on per capita gross domestic product in the host country.
Other analyses of tourism effects from hosting large sporting events find similarly small
effects. Baumann, Matheson, and Muroi (2009) and Baumann and Matheson (2016) examine
visitor arrival data in Hawaii around the NFL Pro Bowl and Honolulu Marathon. These articles
conclude that the net increase in the number of visitors to the state was less than half of the
number of visiting spectators and participants at these events. Fourie and Santana-Gallego (2011)
use a gravity model of annual bilateral tourism for 200 countries between 1995 and 2006. They
find that, on average, an international mega-event increases tourist arrivals by roughly eight
percent in the year of the event, but the results vary widely. The Summer Olympics, FIFA World
Cup, and Cricket World Cup had the largest positive impacts on tourism while the Winter
Olympics and Rugby World Cup were associated with reductions in annual tourist numbers.

Data
Monthly arrival data by foreigners into Brazil are from Anuário Estatístico, which is
administered by the country’s Ministério do Turismo. Arrival data are available by land, air, and
water and in aggregate, by the country of origin of the traveler. In practice, the number of
8

arrivals by water is very small, so the terms “non-air arrivals” and “land arrivals” may be used
roughly interchangeably. These data are available monthly from January 2003 to December
2015.
The quality of any type of economic data is always subject to question especially given
the endemic corruption that is known to permeate the Brazilian government. That being said,
tourism data has some distinct advantages over other types of economic data that makes it useful
for estimating economic impact. Its primary advantage is the ease of collection which likely
reduces measurement error. The data simply requires the tabulation of foreigners entering in to
the country, and Brazil has a reasonably limited number of entry points. Visitors fill out a simple
customs declaration upon arrival and these forms contain all of the information necessary to
capture the required data. This is a far easy task than collecting data from either thousands of
individual firms or millions of consumers about a wide variety of products. Furthermore, very
few business transactions record the national origin of the purchaser making it difficult to
disentangle purchases by visitors from those made by locals. Finally, visitor data is not subject to
many of the types of underreporting or manipulation that other data sources face. Businesses
have a financial incentive to underreport revenues and individuals have the inclination to
underreport income in order to avoid taxes. Data collected from visitor surveys is subject to a
wide array of biases well known in the literature (see Diamond and Hausman (1994) for a nice
discussion). Visitors arriving at an entry point are unable to conceal their presence and generally
have little reason or little ability to falsify their national origin. Of course, one can never rule out
outright fraud on the part of the government agencies themselves, but among any governmental
data source, international arrivals are likely to have among the highest degrees of accuracy,
especially in a country that is fairly geographically isolated from most other nations.
9

Table 1 provides summary statistics for several versions of the arrival data available from
Anuário Estatístico.
Table 1: Mean Arrivals into Brazil
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses)

Total
U.S.A.
Argentina
Uruguay
Germany
Belgium

All Travel
442,057
(148,546)
54,285
(12,658)
108,870
(84,877)
21,082
(10,353)
21,444
(5,873)
2,729
(887)

Airplane Travel
316,749
(72,414)
51,576
(11,928)
48,282
(23,090)
5,837
(2,467)
18,889
(4,903)
2,452
(873)

Percent by Airplane
74.2%
(9.3)
95.1%
(2.8)
52.2%
(13.1)
31.4%
(13.4)
88.6%
(5.0)
89.8%
(11.3)

Brazil attracts an average of 442,057 foreign visitors each month, and Argentina and the
United States provide the first and second largest number of foreign visitors to Brazil,
respectively. Not surprisingly, the distance to Brazil is correlated to both the number of annual
visits as well as the likelihood of arriving by plane. For example, neighboring Uruguay sends
roughly as many annual visitors as the much more populous Germany, but German tourists are
significantly more likely to travel by air. This is an important distinction as it is reasonable to
conclude that travelers arriving by air are likely to be wealthier than those forced to make the
1,500 mile, 28 hour trip from Montevideo by car or bus. Note that arrival data counts the
nationality of the visitor rather than the country from which the tourist is arriving. For example, a
German citizen who flies to Argentina and then drives into Brazil would be counted as a German
visitor arriving by car.
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Empirical Models
We begin with a panel estimation that evaluates the FIFA World Cup’s impact on arrivals
in Brazil. In order to evaluate how outcomes on the field can lead to large fluctuations in
tourism, we begin with a difference-in-difference approach. Due to the length of the tournament,
we establish two treatment groups: countries with national teams in the group stage and the
knockout round. The group stage, which ran from June 12 to June 26 2014, includes three games
for each of the tournament’s 32 teams. Half of these teams advance to a single-elimination
tournament known as the knockout round, which ran from June 28 to July 14 2014. Given this
timing, we formulate the following difference-in-difference in equation (1). Rather than
controlling for only group stage and knockout round participant countries, we use a fixed effect
term for all origin countries.
2014

2014

2014 ∗
∑

2014 ∗

∑

(1)

Equation (1) can be written for either of our dependent variables, specifically all arrivals
and arrivals by plane. The parameters

and

measure the increase in tourism from any

country during the FIFA World Cup months of June and July 2014. The parameters

and

measure the treatment effect, or the increase in tourism from countries with teams in the group
stage and knockout round. One complication is that Anuário Estatístico provides country of
origin data for only 53 countries, and the remaining countries are placed into continent-specific
“other countries” categories that aggregates visitors from typically small contributors to
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Brazilian tourism. We omit these from our data set, though our results are not substantially
affected by their inclusion. Because of this distinction, not all of the national teams in the group
stage and knockout round have tourism data. Specifically, our data includes tourism data from 23
of the possible 31 foreign countries in the group stage and 14 of the 15 foreign countries in the
knockout round.4 We also include monthly dummy variables
variations in tourism and yearly dummy variables

to control for seasonal

to control for worldwide macroeconomic

trends that may impact tourism. These are particularly important since the sample frame
envelops the worldwide economic slowdown during the late 2000s. Because of the monthly and
yearly dummy variables, time trends do not substantially impact the estimates and are omitted.
Figure 1 illustrates all tourist arrivals into Brazil for the portion of our data between
January 2010 and December 2015. The regular spikes in the data indicate seasonal fluctuations
in Brazilian arrivals, which peak during the southern hemisphere summer months December and
January. The largest peak occurs in mid-2014, which is the timing of the FIFA World Cup in
Brazil. The seasonal peaks before and after the World Cup are also interesting. The summer prior
to the FIFA World Cup had a below average seasonal peak, which suggests some degree of time
switching behavior from those postponing a trip to Brazil for the tournament. In comparison, the
summer after the FIFA World Cup had an above average peak in international visitors, which
may be caused by the promotional benefits of hosting. Roughly 74 percent of arrivals to Brazil
travel by plane, though it is clear from Figure 1 that this percentage varies by season. In general,
most of the spike in arrivals that occurs during summer does not happen by airplane.

4 Excluding Brazil, whose national team participated in both the group stage and knockout round, there are 31
foreign countries in the group stage and 15 in the knockout round at the 2014 FIFA World Cup. We have tourism
data for all group stage participants except Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cameroon, Croatia, Ghana, Iran, and
Ivory Coast. We have tourism data for all knockout round participants except Algeria.
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Figure 1: Monthly Arrivals into Brazil; any Country of Origin
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Before estimating equation (1), we pause to check whether the data are stationary. We
employ the standard tests – augmented Dickey-Fuller, Phillips-Perron, and Kwiatowski-PerronSchmidt-Shin – to test for the presence of a unit root. Because these tests are intended for crosssections of time series data (in our sample, arrivals from one country) and not panels, we present
the results for the aggregated data of all international tourism into Brazil over the sample frame.
Though not presented for brevity, the stationary tests for cross-sections of each individual
country are largely similar and available upon request. We use the Ng-Perron approach to find
the optimal lag structure for these tests. This approach suggests 11 lags in both the all arrivals
and air arrivals specifications. The following tests do not contain time trends because they do not
substantially change the outcomes. The results are mixed for the dependent variable in levels. In
comparison, the first difference of each dependent variable uniformly rejects the presence of a
unit root. Table 2 presents these test results.
Table 2: Unit Root Tests; All Foreign Tourism into Brazil
13

Augmented DickeyPhilips-Perron
Kwiatowski-PerronFuller
Schmidt-Shin
-1.731
-5.010
0.868
(p = 0.4152)
(p < 0.001)
(p < 0.01)
-1.904
-7.389
0.752
(p = 0.3303)
(p < 0.001)
(p < 0.01)
-7.225
-20.553
0.263
Δ
(p < 0.001)
(p < 0.001)
(p > 0.1)
-8.124
-28.049
0.204
Δ
(p < 0.001)
(p < 0.001)
(p > 0.1)
Note: Each cell contains the test statistic and p-value. For augmented Dickey-Fuller and
Phillips-Perron, the null hypothesis is the presence of a unit root. For Kwiatowski-PerronSchmidt-Shin, the null hypothesis is a stationary time series. Each test uses lag terms from one to
11.
Because the unit root tests have mixed results, we present two estimations of equation
(1). Table 3 presents the least squares estimation of equation (1) where the dependent variable is
measured in levels. We cluster the standard errors at the country-of-origin level in order to
mitigate heteroskedasticity. In essence, this estimates separate error variances for each country of
origin. Due to the variation in foreign visitors during the seasonal peaks before and after the
2014 FIFA World Cup seen in Figure 1, we also include dummy variables for the Brazilian
summers of December 2013 through February 2014 and December 2014 through February 2015.
Though not presented for brevity and available upon request, all estimations include dummy
variables for each year and month.
Table 3: Difference-in-Difference Estimations
∆

Dependent Variable

June 2014 dummy
July 2014 dummy
June 2014 * Group
Stage Team
July 2014 * Knockout
Round Team

4,381
(p = 0.006)
1,409
(p = 0.067)
19,463
(p = 0.007)
17,114
(p = 0.289)

2,811
(p < 0.001)
634
(p = 0.046)
12,880
(p = 0.002)
3,300
(p = 0.089)
14

∆

3,388
(p = 0.001)
2,052
(p = 0.021)
20,590
(p = 0.006)
13,023
(p = 0.388)

2,557
(p < 0.001)
1,398
(p = 0.021)
13,504
(p < 0.001)
1,012
(p = 0.723)

Summer 2013/2014
Summer 2014/2015

-1,511
(p = 0.111)
3,276
(p = 0.228)

-709
(p = 0.001)
348
(p = 0.106)

-1,412
(p = 0.082)
245
(p = 0.690)

-426
(p < 0.001)
-260
(p = 0.009)

It is clear from the estimates at Table 3 that the 2014 FIFA World Cup attracted tourists
from all over the world. For countries without a national team in 2014 FIFA World Cup, we
estimate that the event attracted between 3,388 and 4,381 visitors per country during June. We
also estimate a positive bump in international tourism during July 2014. Countries with a
national team in the group stage attracted an additional 20,000 visitors per country in June.
Further, countries with national teams in the knockout round brought an additional 13,000 to
17,000 visitors to Brazil, though these estimates are not statistically significant. It is also notable
that a large percentage of the July 2014 foreign tourism gains did not arrive by airplane. While
foreign net air arrivals during July 2014 are positive, their estimates are smaller and less precise
compared to the estimations that analyze all arrivals to Brazil. We also find some evidence of
time switching tourism behavior. The summer prior to the 2014 FIFA World Cup had a negative
impact on net foreign tourism, though we cannot be certain this was caused by tourists delaying a
trip to Brazil for the upcoming 2014 FIFA World Cup. In addition, the summer following the
2014 FIFA World Cup produces a net increase in foreign tourism, which may be caused by the
promotional benefits of the event. We conclude that the draw of the home country’s national
team is a powerful force in FIFA World Cup international tourism, and it is important to note
that all but two of the group stage participants (the host country and previous FIFA World Cup
champion) are not known at the time when countries bid to host the event.
We now turn to estimations for specific countries-of-origin in order to analyze how
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exogenous outcomes on the field impact international visitors. Because our estimations now use
cross section data, we omit the group stage, knockout round, and fixed effect controls from
equation (1) due to perfect collinearity. Each row of Table 4 represents two estimations of
equation (1): the first set of estimates uses all arrivals to Brazil while the second set uses only
airplane arrivals. Since Anuário Estatístico provides arrival data for 53 countries, equation (1)
can be estimated for each country of origin. For brevity, Table 4 only presents estimations for
total foreign arrivals into Brazil and a subset of countries whose national team participated in at
least the group stage. Estimations for each country of origin are available upon request.

Table 4: Least Squares Estimations; Dependent Variable in Levels

Country
of Origin
All Countries

Made
Knockout?
N/A

U.S.A.

Yes

Argentina

Yes

Chile

Yes

Colombia

Yes

Ecuador

No

Uruguay

No

Germany

Yes

Belgium

No

All
World Cup
June 2014
696,770
(p < 0.001)
85,073
(p < 0.001)
204,772
(p < 0.001)
59,618
(p < 0.001)
38,823
(p < 0.001)
13,853
(p < 0.001)
18,414
(p < 0.001)
20,774
(p < 0.001)
7,981
16

Arrivals
World Cup
July 2014
318,835
(p < 0.001)
12,686
(p = 0.008)
257,633
(p < 0.001)
-6,333
(p = 0.040)
1,482
(p = 0.203)
-191
(p = 0.650)
815
(p = 0.739)
8,074
(p < 0.001)
63

Airplane
World Cup
June 2014
474,327
(p < 0.001)
83,900
(p < 0.001)
34,555
(p < 0.001)
28,852
(p < 0.001)
34,509
(p < 0.001)
13,010
(p < 0.001)
7,182
(p < 0.001)
20,605
(p < 0.001)
8,036

Arrivals
World Cup
July 2014
92,527
(p = 0.003)
12,221
(p = 0.007)
25,838
(p < 0.001)
-5,678
(p = 0.041)
1,711
(p = 0.072)
12
(p = 0.978)
-1,821
(p = 0.035)
8,422
(p < 0.001)
56

(p < 0.001)
(p = 0.822)
Note: Each estimation uses Huber/White robust standard errors.

(p < 0.001)

(p = 0.830)

The main result from Table 4 is that the FIFA World Cup increased net foreign arrivals into
Brazil by about one million people over June and July 2014, and a little more than half of which
arrived by airplane. The majority of this increase occurs in June, which is also when all 32 teams
are still competing.
Of all countries of origin (including those not presented at Table 4), Argentina provided
the most net arrivals to Brazil during the FIFA World Cup. This is likely driven by Argentina’s
population, the success of its national team, and the country’s proximity to Brazil. We estimate
that over 200,000 additional Argentines visited Brazil in June 2014, and this number jumped to
over 250,000 in July 2014. In fact, we estimate that over 80 percent of the rise in net tourism
during July comes from Argentina. Further, a large majority of Argentine net arrivals did not
enter Brazil by airplane. Less than 17 percent arrived by plane in June 2014 and only ten percent
arrived by plane in July 2014. We will explore this further in the next section, but it is important
to once again note that not all tourists are created equal when it comes to their impact on the
Brazilian economy. The fact that the World Cup was associated with large increases in air
arrivals from rich countries such as the United States and Germany bodes well for the subsequent
spending in the country after their arrival. This is not necessarily so with the hundreds of
thousands of Argentinians who arrived by car. Those visitors without the means to avoid the
arduous trip by land from Argentina to the various Brazilian host cities are unlikely to have spent
vast sums of money while in the country.
As the results from the unit root testing are somewhat ambiguous, Table 5 estimates uses
the first difference of the dependent variable. As with Table 4, month and year are included in all
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estimations and only a subset of origin locations are presented but all results are available upon
request.
Table 5: Least Squares Estimations; Dependent Variable in Differences
All
Arrivals
Country
Made
World Cup
World Cup
of Origin
Knockout?
June 2014
July 2014
N/A
676,946
296,652
All Countries
(p < 0.001)
(p < 0.001)
Yes
81,444
9,300
U.S.A.
(p < 0.001)
(p = 0.004)
Yes
192,981
241,513
Argentina
(p < 0.001)
(p < 0.001)
Yes
62,438
-4,381
Chile
(p < 0.001)
(p < 0.001)
Yes
38,641
1,390
Colombia
(p < 0.001)
(p = 0.044)
No
13,897
-295
Ecuador
(p < 0.001)
(p = 0.258)
No
15,771
-2,502
Uruguay
(p < 0.001)
(p < 0.001)
Yes
19,721
6,755
Germany
(p < 0.001)
(p < 0.001)
Yes
8,044
239
Belgium
(p < 0.001)
(p = 0.327)
Note: Each estimation uses Huber/White robust standard errors.

Airplane
World Cup
June 2014
472,581
(p < 0.001)
80,649
(p < 0.001)
41,076
(p < 0.001)
32,691
(p < 0.001)
34,409
(p < 0.001)
13,288
(p < 0.001)
7,874
(p < 0.001)
19,291
(p < 0.001)
7,948
(p < 0.001)

Arrivals
World Cup
July 2014
94,867
(p < 0.001)
9,251
(p = 0.003)
32,367
(p < 0.001)
-2,079
(p = 0.140)
1,530
(p = 0.001)
422
(p = 0.535)
-1,536
(p < 0.001)
7,040
(p < 0.001)
136
(p = 0.650)

The results in Table 5 are largely similar to Table 4. In this estimation, the total increase
in net arrivals is about 973,000 compared to 1.015 million in Table 4. Argentina remains the
largest arrival country, and also the only group of visitors to increase net arrivals in July
compared to June.
Counterfactual: Belgium v. Argentina, July 5, 2014
While one million net visitors to Brazil is a substantial influx of tourism, it is important to
note that outcomes on the field play a significant role in FIFA World Cup tourism. On July 5
2014, Argentina eliminated Belgium by a score of one to zero. The following estimates the
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impact on net arrivals had Belgium won instead in order to illustrate how on-field results
influence net tourism.
Figures 2 and 3 display net arrivals into Brazil during the FIFA World Cup months June
and July 2014, respectively, using estimates from Table 3 and other estimations omitted for
brevity. In June 2014, we estimate net arrivals into Brazil increased by 696,770, which we break
into seven origin locations. The pie chart for July 2014 is similarly constructed but with five
origin locations.
Figure 2: Estimated World Cup Net Tourism, June 2014

Net Arrivals June 2014
(Total = 696,770)
Argentina
England
Rest of Europe
United States
Chile
Colombia
All Other Countries

Figure 3: Estimated World Cup Net Tourism, July 2014
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Net Arrivals July 2014
(Total = 318,835)
Argentina
England
Rest of Europe
United States
All Other Countries

There are two notable aspects of Figures 2 and 3. First, July net arrivals are less than half
of net arrivals in June. This is not surprising given that half of the teams are eliminated by the
first week of July. Second, the percentage of net arrivals from Argentina increased substantially
between June and July: roughly 29.4 percent in June compared to over 80 percent in July.
Using these results, we estimate net arrivals in Brazil had Argentina lost to Belgium.
Rather than assuming zero Argentine net arrivals if their national team lost to Belgium, we use
its neighbor Uruguay, whose national team was eliminated by a loss in the knockout round to
Colombia on June 29, as a guide. Similarly, we use German net arrivals to estimate the increase
in Belgian net arrivals had Belgium beat Argentina. The German national team would ultimately
win the 2014 FIFA World Cup, and this exercise assumes its participation deep into the knockout
round spurred the increase in German net arrivals.
Based on the estimates from Table 4, July had roughly 38.9 percent of the German net
arrivals compared to June. Assuming the same percentage had Belgium advanced further in the
tournament, this translates to an increase in net arrivals of about 3,100 Belgians. We use a
similar comparison to estimate the loss in net tourism from Argentina had its national team lost
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to Belgium. July net arrivals from Uruguay are roughly 4.4 percent of the June estimate.
Assuming the same percentage, we estimate net arrivals from Argentina would be roughly 9,000
had its national team lost. Comparing these outcomes suggests that the impact of Argentina
beating Belgium, which only happened by one goal, led to an increase in over 245,000 net
arrivals. Given the overall increase in net tourism is roughly one million, this translates to onequarter of the net increase in Brazilian visitors during the 2014 FIFA World Cup. In essence,
Brazil was fortunate that Argentina advanced deep into the tournament as it spurred a substantial
amount of its FIFA World Cup tourism. Table 5 summarizes this information.
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Table 5: Counterfactual Estimation

Belgium
Argentina

Observed July Net
Arrivals given
Argentina won
63
257,632

Estimated July Net
Arrivals had
Belgium won
3,101
9,063

Net Effect had
Belgium won
3,038
+ -248,569
-245,531

While these comparisons are not perfect, the size of the impact is striking. It is clear from
this exercise that a substantial amount of tourism is out of the control of FIFA World Cup
planners. While other counterfactuals are possible, such as changing the outcome of a knockout
round victory by Colombia over Uruguay, they are small in comparison to Argentina’s
advancement. We conclude that the uncertainty of on-the-field outcomes introduces a significant
amount of statistical noise to any ex ante economic impact estimation.

Conclusions
We estimate that the 2014 FIFA World Cup attracted an additional one million visitors to
Brazil over a two-month period. This is a substantial figure considering that the event occurred
during the typically low-tourism winter months of Brazil. It is also notable that our estimates
exceeded government predictions prior to the event. This is an improvement over the 2010 FIFA
World Cup in South Africa, where the net increases in foreign arrivals during the tournament
were between one quarter and one half of expectations leading up to the event.
We also identify a source of substantial variation in tourism: on-field results. Our
estimates indicate that roughly a quarter of the net increase in tourism occurred because of
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Argentina’s advancement to the final game. We interpret this finding as a cautionary example to
any future hosts of the FIFA World Cup: ex ante estimates cannot incorporate on-field outcomes,
and these outcomes have a significant impacts on tourism. Based on our findings, organizers of
the 2018 FIFA World Cup in Russia should hope that European teams from populous countries,
such as Germany, France, and England, advance deep in the tournament in order to maximize
foreign tourism and therefore economic impact. Furthermore, the success of these countries
would be doubly beneficial as they are likely to have relatively wealthy fans who would have the
ability to spend more while in the country. The majority of Brazil’s tourist windfall came by car
or bus from Argentina, suggesting a lower economic impact than one might normally expect
from this number of visitors.
It is also worth noting that the impact of on-field results varies across large sporting
events. For example, it is hard to imagine that Olympic tourism is substantially influenced by the
advancement of team or athlete to the medal round. However, for other events such as the Super
Bowl or opening rounds of the NCAA Men’s Basketball Tournament, tourism is likely impacted
by the proximity of the teams in the game. Nevertheless, despite the unexpectedly large increase
in tourism due to the FIFA World Cup, this research offers another source of skepticism to any
ex ante estimate of economic impact.
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